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In recent years, the English National Health
Service (NHS) has been experiencing rising
demand across all healthcare sectors. In the
context of an ageing population, policy actors
see improving access to good quality community
nursing as key to reducing avoidable hospital
admissions, lengths of stay and, therefore, NHS
costs, while at the same time improving the
patient experience (NHSE, 2014; 2015).
Community nurses work in specialist roles
ranging from providing palliative care in
hospices, care homes or patients’ homes, mental
health and learning disability nurses for adults
or children, health visitors working with families
and children, custody nurse practitioners
working in police stations, or working as part of
nursing teams (for example district nurses and
community matrons), providing a full range of
nursing care to people who are house-bound,
therefore serving the most vulnerable and frail
NHS users.
Since 2008, health policy in England has
been focusing increasingly on measuring and
monitoring quality in healthcare services (DH,
2008a). To ensure quality improvements in
community nursing, providers are required to
meet several quality indicators, which are
monitored primarily via contracts, but also by
provider submission of quality accounts to
regional or national bodies, internally within
each provider organization, and through Care
Quality Commission inspections. Quality
indicators (QIs) can be nationally mandated,
regional, or locally selected (DH, 2009). In
addition to QIs, commissioners are required to
include in their contracts with providers an
incentive scheme known as Commissioning for
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN), which makes
part of providers’ income conditional on
achieving pre-agreed quality improvements
(DH, 2008b). Since April 2012, CQUIN schemes
have been worth a maximum of 2.5% of the
overall value of each contract.
CQUINs rely on robust measuring and
monitoring processes which can be problematic
in an area like district nursing (Davies et al.,
2011; Horrocks et al., 2012). Patients are
generally older and frail, with deteriorating
conditions and co-morbidities that make it
difficult to establish meaningful indicators. A
further challenge is attributing a change in
health status to an intervention delivered by
district nurses, since district nurses tend to
work alongside other services, agency staff and
informal carers (Nancarrow, 2013). Nurses are
not with the patient for 24 hours a day, so they
cannot directly oversee care to ensure
compliance with best practice. Additional
challenges include lack of good quality data
and weaknesses in IT infrastructure, workforce
pressures, and gaps in communication between
diverse providers such as, social care, mental
health, and primary care (Goodman et al.,
2011; RCN, 2013; Foot et al., 2014).
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improving quality in healthcare services. To ensure quality improvements in
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Since the introduction of the internal
market in the English NHS in the early 1990s,
the topic of contracting in healthcare has
received extensive attention in the academic
literature (Deakin, 1996; Flynn and Williams,
1997; Chalkley and McVicar, 2008; Petsoulas et
al., 2011). Financial incentives and other pay-
for-performance schemes are used in NHS
contracts, and several studies of such schemes
have been published (Roland, 2004;
Christianson et al., 2007; Steel et al., 2007;
Mannion and Davies, 2008; McDonald et al.,
2010; Kristensen et al., 2013). One example is
the evaluation of the Advancing Quality
initiative in the north west of England which
found that, while in the first 18 months of the
intervention there was a reduction in mortality
for the incentivized conditions, this reduction
was not observed in the 42-month period of the
programme (Sutton et al., 2012; McDonald et
al., 2015). An evaluation of the CQUIN
programme found that, in general, the impact
of the CQUIN policy initiative was
disappointing (McDonald et al., 2013). A review
of the literature of pay-for-performance
initiatives in the NHS emphasised the lack of
robust evidence on the actual effectiveness of
such schemes (Lagarde et al., 2013).
This paper reports on a study of how
financial incentives are used in district nursing:
an area of care which is, as indicated above,
particularly difficult to measure and monitor.
The paper is unique because, in contrast to
previous studies, it focuses exclusively on district
nursing care.
In the following section, we provide a
summary of relevant theoretical issues on the
use of contractual incentives in the public sector.
We then describe the methods used, followed
by a section on findings. In the last section, we
discuss the implications of using CQUINs in
district nursing in particular, and more
generally in the NHS.
Contractual incentives in public services
The introduction of incentives into contracts
originates in the ‘principal–agent’ problem,
which is the problem of motivating someone
(the agent) to act on behalf of and in the
interests of another (the principal) (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1983; White, 1985).
The contractual relationships between
commissioners and providers in the English
NHS can be described as an attempt to tackle
the principal–agent problem, which is created
by the existence of information asymmetry or
‘moral hazard’ between the two parties
(Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert, 1983). Within a
contract, the principal delegates the agent with
performing a task(s) specified in the contract,
in return for a pre-agreed financial payment or
incentive (Shavell, 1979). The problem arises
when, as in healthcare, provision of the service
occurs over long periods of time, and the
service is often so specialized and asset-specific
that it lends itself to ‘gaming’ on the part of the
agent (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985).
Limited information on the part of
commissioners means that providers can avoid
acting in the commissioners’ interest by
skimping on quality.
To ensure that the agent delivers the quality
of service desired by the principal, the contract
needs to include measurable objectives whose
performance the principal is able to monitor.
As has been pointed out, however, measuring
and monitoring healthcare quality is not easy,
especially in areas such as district nursing
provision (Allen, 2002; Davies et al., 2011;
Horrocks et al., 2012; Bowers and Pellett, 2013).
Economists argue that the processes of
negotiating and monitoring contracts in
complex environments involve high transaction
costs, incurred in activities such as investing in
reliable systems of data collection and significant
amounts of staff time in collecting, recording,
and analysing information. There are two types
of transaction costs: ex ante transaction costs
refer to the costs incurred prior to the signing
of the contract, such as staff time in specifying
and negotiating the terms of the contract. Ex
post transaction costs refer to the costs associated
with monitoring delivery of the terms of the
contract as well as enforcement in case of
disputes (Maher, 1997; Ashton, 1998; Marini
and Street, 2007).
The principal–agent problem can also be
eased by putting in place additional contractual
incentives, i.e. additional rewards attached to
the achievement of specific goals. Difficulties
with measuring and monitoring health
outcomes, however, mean that making payment
conditional on achieving specific outcomes
transfers risk to the agent and therefore such
contracts may take longer to be negotiated and
agreed on, increasing thereby the ex ante
transaction costs (Arrow, 1971; Shavell, 1979).
In light of the difficulties and high
transaction costs in selecting and applying
financial incentives, some scholars have
questioned the effectiveness of, or the need for,
using such incentives in the public sector
(Berwick, 1995; Burgess and Ratto, 2003;
Ferman, 2004; Fisher, 2006; Young and
Conrad, 2007). One argument is that public
sector workers are intrinsically motivated to
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perform the desired outcomes (for example
delivering quality in education or healthcare)
without the need for financial incentives (Perry,
2000). In contrast to private sector
organizations, public sector employees are
motivated primarily by the idea of a ‘mission’
rather than profit (Besley and Ghatak, 2003).
In fact, the introduction of financial incentives
may have the unintended consequence of
eroding such intrinsic motivation (Kreps, 1997).
A further difficulty in respect of public
services is the presence of multiple principals
and conflicting goals. In healthcare, for
example, service providers are the agents of
commissioners, the government, the patients,
and the citizens. The priorities of patients or
doctors may conflict with those of the
government (for example providing the latest
treatment versus minimizing costs). Or district
nurses may place more emphasis on spending
time with patients, as opposed to meeting
managerial demands for limiting visit time.
Devising appropriate incentives that would
satisfy all principals at the same time may be
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Furthermore, if the service is complex and
multi-tasking is involved, contractual clauses
involving financial incentives may place
emphasis on what is measurable at the expense
of what is less measurable but perhaps of more
importance to recipients of the service. Quality
may therefore be compromised if employees
are rewarded for performing easily measurable
tasks (Besley and Ghatak, 2003).
Methods
The findings reported in this paper are part of
a larger study on measuring quality in district
nursing (Horrocks et al., 2017). Here we report
findings from interviews with managerial and
clinical staff of providers and commissioners,
and from focus groups.
First, we conducted a telephone and email
survey in which we collected local CQUIN
documents from all commissioners across
England. Second, five case study sites were
selected, each comprising a commissioner and
their community nursing provider. The case
sites were identified based on the findings of
the CQUIN survey, and were selected using
inclusion criteria such as geographical location,
range and number of local quality indicator
schemes, and type of provider organization. In
terms of geographical spread, one case study
site was situated in the north of England, two in
the Midlands, one in south west England and
one in south east England. Apart from a private
provider, which we were unable to recruit, we
included a wide range of provider type (one
combined acute and community care NHS
trust, two community care NHS providers, one
community care social enterprise, and one
combined community and mental healthcare
NHS provider). Four of our case study sites
were located in urban settings with a higher
rate of deprivation than the national average;
one was located in a rural setting with a lower
rate of deprivation than the national average.
This purposive sampling provided a variety of
contextual data which enabled a level of
comparative analysis considered suitable for
the purposes of the study. District nurses in
rural settings, for example, face some different
challenges from those in urban settings.
Similarly, the type of organization within which
district nurses work impacts significantly on
the delivery of care. We conducted 19 interviews
with commissioner managers, 23 with provider
managers, 10 with community nursing team
leaders, and nine focus groups with a total of 45
frontline staff. Participation in focus groups
was achieved by inviting district nurses via
their team leaders. We observed 20 meetings,
in which the selection, measurement and
monitoring of quality indicators were discussed.
Data were collected by four team
members. Semi-structured interviews and
focus groups, which were undertaken using
purpose-designed interview schedules, were
audio–recorded and transcribed verbatim,
while team members took detailed notes
during observation of meetings. Data were
subsequently anonymized and entered onto
NVivo 10 software. Data were open-coded
initially to generate concepts which were
then discussed and agreed by the research
team. Once the codes were agreed, a team
approach to coding was adopted, with each
researcher coding a particular set of data
across the sites. In this way, each team
member gained a cross-site perspective. The
individual databases were merged regularly
into an NVivo master database in order to
check progress and assess whether there
were any differences in the way codes were
being applied. At the end of fieldwork, we
conducted 10 dissemination events across
the country in order to validate our findings
with managerial and clinical NHS staff, as
well as service users.
Findings
This section is divided into three subthemes
relating to the theoretical framework
outlined above on transaction costs and use
of financial incentives in the public sector.
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We focus our findings on specifying and
applying local CQUINs in district nursing.
Ex ante transaction costs
Participants reported that discussing the detail
before finally agreeing the CQUIN scheme
could be time-consuming, often three to five
months:
It took us 25 iterations before we got the first spec.
signed off. Twenty-five drafts! (Director of
quality, provider.)
I’d have no doubt that the CCG have no
understanding about the additional workload
that puts on organizations. (Manager of quality,
provider.)
Policy guidance suggests that
commissioners and providers work together in
identifying the quality targets to be prioritized
in their local area (DH, 2010). The prevailing
view from participants, however, was that
identification and development of CQUINs
was driven by commissioners:
The CQUINs were really very much designed by
the commissioners and then fairly late on, they
had a conversation with our contracting team. I
think it was really almost towards the very end
when they were almost signed and sealed that it
became a ‘do you want to?’ comment. (Manager
of nursing services, provider.)
The problem with this was that
commissioners might not be familiar with the
implications of the incentives, or clear about
the objectives the CQUINs were trying to
achieve:
I think one of the biggest issues is commissioners
setting up indicators that they don’t actually
understand and they have read somewhere or
pulled out somewhere and actually defining
what it is that you’re counting in the first place.
(Business manager, provider.)
Commissioner-driven selection of local
CQUINs, and lack of input by providers in
the very early stages, could result in
unnecessarily lengthy discussions about the
appropriateness of indicators and increase
transaction costs by protracting the
negotiating period.
The high demand on staff time also meant
that providers were struggling to contribute
meaningfully in selecting appropriate
incentives. Some commissioners felt that,
despite their efforts to include them,
providers were unable to engage fully with
developing appropriate CQUIN indicators.
One commissioner recounted when a
provider had a good CQUIN suggestion but
their idea was not operationalized, due to
time pressures on its clinical staff. Most
commissioners in our study recognized the
value of involving providers early in the
process of agreeing CQUIN targets, both in
order to contain transaction costs and to
increase the likelihood of success by achieving
ownership of the objectives.
Participants said they needed clear,
measurable, and achievable goals. Parties to
contractual financial incentives in district
nursing needed to avoid introducing targets
which were not under the control of those
implementing them, for example, reducing
avoidable hospital admissions:
There was a lot of argument about whether we
were going to financially incentivize them to
actually deliver a reduction. We’re not going to
do that now. Because what they’re saying is there
are a lot of patients where a district nurse might
go in there and couldn’t have done anything to
stop that admission, and there are so many
variables that are outside of their control. (Senior
quality and safety manager, commissioning
support group [CSU].)
Commissioners mentioned the need for
striking a balance between, on the one hand,
agreeing achievable and measurable
incentives and, on the other hand, failing to
challenge providers by putting in place easy
targets:
We wouldn’t want to make it so easy for them to
deliver; but we wouldn’t make it so hard that we
can’t get them interested or it’s impossible or we’re
spending all our year arguing over whether or
not they’ve achieved it. (Assistant director,
integrated commissioning, clinical
commissioning group [CCG].)
Putting in place measurable quality targets,
however, is not easy because of the nature of
the service:
[It is] so difficult to define, actually, the softer
side of those interactions—it’s not ‘turn up for
clinic, dress your leg, off you go’. There’s so many
more different interactions within the patient’s
own home that are really, almost impossible to
capture. (Programme manager:
transformation, provider.)
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Ex post transaction costs
In addition to the time and effort spent in
developing and agreeing CQUIN indicators,
commissioners devoted resources to
monitoring them, thus increasing
substantially the ex post transaction costs.
One participant described some difficulties
with monitoring such targets:
It’s difficult to monitor it because it is out and
about and delivered in patients’ homes. So, it is
probably much more problematic than inpatient
services and outpatient services…by its nature it
is quite hidden and it is difficult to assess how
good that’s been without relying on your patients
to tell you really. (Head of general nursing,
provider.)
Monitoring achievement of contractual
goals was very resource intensive and, as
commissioners lacked the resources for
detailed monitoring, they often relied on
data they received from the providers without
further verification. Referring to the quality
report received regularly from the provider,
one commissioner said:
It was good, but it’s always good. Whether I
believe it or not is a different issue. (GP: clinical
member, CCG.)
Occasionally,  commissioners
supplemented the data received from
providers with visits and shadowing of district
nurses. Such visits were very useful in giving
commissioners an understanding of the
challenges in measuring and monitoring the
‘soft’ aspects of district nursing quality. Even
though commissioners had resources for a
very limited number of visits and shadowing,
one commissioner explained their value:
I went to this one very isolated farm in the middle
of nowhere—it really was. This little old lady,
85, on her own; and it was the only contact she
had and actually, the district nurses do have to do
a bit of the social thing, and just checking they’re
all right…they can’t just turn up and dress a leg
ulcer and then go, there’s a lot more to it.
(Associate director of community services
and primary care, CCG.)
In addition to difficulties with capturing
the ‘soft’ aspects of quality, commissioners and
providers faced the problem of poor data quality
and IT systems:
So, the way things are at the minute, it is
incredibly time consuming and very
cumbersome…if you’re doing a lot of switching
between pages you’re doing a lot of sitting,
waiting for your page to load. So, that all adds to
time. (Deputy head of nursing, provider.)
I think it is probably true to say that data in
general in community nursing has been of very
poor quality, historically. (Associate director
of strategic planning and performance,
provider.)
Limited resources for collecting and
reporting information was an issue in a service
which was increasingly stretched by workforce
pressures (for example ageing nursing
workforce, problems with recruitment, high
sickness rates), increases in demand, and
complexity of caseload. Consequently, district
nurses had to work beyond normal working
hours:
It’s an ever-increasingly complex role...so quality,
you know, we’re trying ever so hard, but we’re
doing that a lot in extra hours that we’re not being
paid for. (Nursing team manager, provider.)
This in turn resulted in increased sickness
rates and nurses leaving the service. Service
managers were caught between the time
pressures nurses were under and the need to
make them understand the importance of
collecting data for the service:
What we’re trying to do is to support them to
see…that if you don’t input your data at the end
of the month it does impact on quality of care…we
don’t see it reflected in the numbers, commissioners
think the work isn’t being done or isn’t there,
therefore they reduce the amount of money that
they invest in that service. (Associate director
of integrated care.)
Because of difficulties with the formal
processes of monitoring CQUIN targets,
participants stressed the importance of
maintaining flexibil ity and good
relationships:
Part of what you do in commissioning…it is not
just around having a bit of paper and what you
sign off and what you monitor, it is about your
relationship. So, you can put all of those indicators
in place and everything but if you don’t have a
relationship whereby you can negotiate influence
and change, then you know you might as well not
bother. (Director of quality, safety, and
governance, CCG.)
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Using contractual incentives in district nursing
It can be argued that despite the high
transaction costs involved in agreeing and
monitoring incentivized targets in district
nursing, such incentives are worthwhile if
they can be shown to improve the service.
Participants’ reactions about the usefulness
of CQUINs, however, were mixed. One
perception was that incentives concentrated
on the measurable and missed the softer
aspects of quality. On the other hand,
monitoring quality indicators throughout
the year increased service transparency and
provider accountability. One provider
business manager felt that quality indicators
were an essential part of any organization.
Although some tangible results such as
improvement in preventing pressure ulcers
were reported, participants also valued some
less tangible outcomes of CQUINs:
What the CQUIN did was give us a focus…and
I think that’s been one of the most useful things...we
decided if we were really going to do something
that is quality-driven, that isn’t just a number, it’s
about critiquing what do we do as we go.
(Associate director of integrated care,
provider.)
Financial incentives would be expected
to be successful if the payments were made to
the teams implementing them. Importantly,
participants, especially nurses, complained
that CQUIN funding was often not received
by community nursing teams but was used
instead elsewhere within the organization.
Nursing teams were often required to
implement the change without the help of
the financial incentive. In one case study
site, failure to achieve a CQUIN was due to
nurses being unable to attend the requisite
training.
If GPs could meet their targets they get a monetary
incentive, don’t they? I’m sure, it would be nice
that if district nursing service meet all their
targets that, you know, then ensure that staffing
levels are maintained or that extra training is
given or…There’s some incentive for the nurses
on the ground. (Focus group: community
nurse.)
The theory on financial incentives
indicates that if performance indicators are
‘noisy’, then making rewards very sensitive
to performance imposes unnecessary risk on
the agent (Besley and Ghatak, 2003).
Participants reported that providers were
unlikely to agree to CQUINs which were
perceived to be unclear or not easy to
measure, for fear of losing income. One of
our case study sites did not include any
CQUINs in their contract in order to avoid
the likelihood of losing income in the event
of non-achievement.
As has been argued, the use of financial
incentives may be less necessary in public
services because the motivation and values
of the agent may be more aligned with those
of the principal than is perhaps the case in
the private sector. Both commissioners and
providers want to provide good patient care.
In the case of district nursing, providing
good care took precedence over meeting
financial incentives:
When [nurses] feel pulled between delivering
patient care and actually recording information,
at times when they are busy it will often be the
information that is forgotten or left…there’s still
that issue around what they perceive, what they
believe is the most important part of their job,
which is about delivering care. (Head of
neighbourhood services.)
The academic literature on applying
financial incentives in the public sector points
to the existence of multiple principals that
need to be satisfied at the same time. Setting
appropriate incentivized goals may be
difficult in the context of conflicting
demands. Importantly, some participants
mentioned that not only clinical staff but also
service users needed to be involved in the
selection of appropriate targets to be
incentivized:
What we perceive as we’re delivering a quality
service may mean something completely different
to the patient. So, for us, it might be that we
deliver the best possible care according to the
latest research, but for the citizen it will be the
amount of time you spent with them and how
cared for they felt. So we’d be measuring probably
completely different things. (Programme
manager: transformation, provider.)
Consulting patients in setting contractual
incentives, however, is not easy in the context
of district nursing where patients are house-
bound and can also be frail. Conflicting
demands from patients and commissioners
may be difficult to reconcile. Commissioners
strive to incentivize efficiency which for
patients may sometimes translate to less time
devoted to their care.
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Discussion
Summary of key findings
Achieving quality improvements across the
NHS has been a central policy aim by successive
governments in England in their attempts to
modernize healthcare provision since the early
1990s. Quality of care, however, is a versatile
concept which can mean different things to
different agents. Its definition often includes
factors such as value for money, clinical
effectiveness, patient safety and patient
satisfaction. Some aspects of quality are easier
to measure than others. In the case of district
nursing, for example, tangible clinical
improvements such as a reduction of pressure
ulcers can be demonstrated more easily
compared to less tangible outcomes such as
patient satisfaction. In addition, as mentioned
earlier in the paper, clearly attributing outcomes
to specific interventions is especially difficult in
the case of district nursing due to the nature of
the service.
In 2008, the CQUIN framework was
introduced in the NHS in England to incentivize
providers to improve quality of care. Since
their introduction, however, researchers have
questioned the real benefit of CQUINs. As we
show in this paper, the use of incentives in
district nursing involves high transaction costs
in specifying and monitoring incentivized
targets. The selection of targets involves lengthy
consultation periods both between and within
commissioning and provider organizations.
Reconciling diverse and often conflicting views
on priorities suitable to incentivize, requires
substantial time and effort by healthcare staff.
With many providers struggling to recruit
district nurses, and in the context of severe
workforce shortages, commissioners may
continue to find it difficult to engage clinical
staff in selecting appropriate CQUINs.
Commissioners told us that they lack the
data needed to measure healthcare outcomes,
benchmarking, and costs, which would help
them develop new currencies and payment
mechanisms. Monitoring CQUINs is also
resource intensive and it becomes more
problematic in the context of cumbersome IT
systems and poor data quality. CQUINs were
meant to be targeted at achieving specific quality
improvements by using allocated funding. One
of the problems with implementing CQUINs,
however, has been that often the money did
not reach the nursing teams implementing the
change, but it was subsumed under the
organization’s general income. Nurses were
therefore required to perform additional work
with no additional funding. Furthermore,
providers are likely to agree to financial
incentives that are measurable but which may
not necessarily reflect patient preferences.
Strengths and limitations
Our study has some limitations. First, it is not
an evaluation of whether the application of
CQUINs improves clinical outcomes. Second,
the inclusion of only five case studies means
that the results may not be generalizable. On
the other hand, the research relied heavily on
triangulation from many different sources, such
as telephone survey, in-depth interviews with
managerial, clinical, and lay participants,
observation of meetings, shadowing of district
nurses, focus groups, and dissemination events
with a focus on validation of findings. This
triangulation yielded a wealth of rich, contextual
information which we hope added credibility
to the validity of our findings.
Implications
CQUINs are applied in a context where
healthcare providers are compiling and
monitoring a host of other quality indicators,
such as quality accounts, and key performance
indicators. Given the difficulties with applying
CQUINs, the question is:
Are they offering value for money or does the
effort required to deliver them outweigh the
costs?
Our research shows that the benefits resulting
from CQUINs are not always clear. While
participants referred to some non-clinical
benefits, such as promoting accountability and
providing a forum for discussion on the
priorities of the service, some providers
reported that, given the high transaction costs
involved in specifying and monitoring CQUINs,
they were not worth the effort. Providers tended
not to regard CQUINs as a real incentive, since
the funding attached to them is top-sliced from
the providers’ overall annual income instead of
being additional money.
In contrast to previous years, the latest
policy guidance introduced longer-term
contracts (two years instead of one) and national
CQUINs, tailored-made for community
nursing. This may contribute towards reducing
slightly the ex ante transaction costs. In addition,
part of the CQUIN funding (1.5% of annual
contract value) has become tied to achieving
integrated care working and financial stability
within local health economies (NHSE, 2016).
Owing to the increased financial risk involved,
the latter change might make CQUINs less
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popular with providers. If CQUINs are to
deliver the policy intention, they must be
directed at specific and achievable quality
improvements and the requisite funding should
be directly received by the teams implementing
the change. The process of applying CQUINs,
not only in community services but across the
NHS, needs to be streamlined, with clear targets
as well as strong leadership and ownership
from clinical staff both on the provider and the
commissioner side. Otherwise, we suggest the
CQUIN schemes become entirely voluntary or
are phased out completely.
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